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WHAT'S WRONG WITH AGENCY?
ALFRED CONARD*
THE EMERGENCE OF AGENCY
I FIRST shall endeavor to show," Professor Holmes told his class
in 1882, "why agency is a proper title in the law."' It is not, he
contended, merely an application of the general principles of tort, con-
tract, possession, and ratification. Agency brings into operation new and
distinct rules of law; the facts which constitute it have legal effects pecu-
liar to agency alone.'
In a sense, agency was already a "title in the law." William Paley,
an English barrister, had published a book on the subject in 1811, of
which an American edition appeared in 1822.3 In 1839, Justice Story
had published his treatise on agency as the first volume of his immortal
Commentaries." Both these works had served as compulsory reading
for Harvard law students before Holmes's time.5
But the conception of agency held by Paley and Story, and developed
in the Harvard curriculum, was not Holmes's conception of the sub-
ject. Paley's full title was "The Law of Principal and Agent, Chiefly
With Reference to Mercantile Transactions." Story's was "Agency as.
a Branch of Commercial and Maritime Jurisprudence." The course
which Holmes was teaching was called, as it had been for some years,
"Agency and Carriers." "
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Histary of Agen-y, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS o ANGLO-
AxERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 368 (1909), reprinted from 4 HFnv.L.ltEv. 345, 5 id. 1
(1891). These lectures will be cited hereafter with references to pages in the SELECT
ESSAYS.
2 Holmes, supra note 1, at 369.
3 WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINcIPAL AxD AGENT, CHIEF-
LY WITH REFERENCE TO MERCANTIrE TR.ANSAOTIONqS (2d Am. ed. 1822). The
cover of my copy (apparently the original binding) bears the imprint "Paley
on Agency." Paley also uses the term "agency," apparently as synonymous with
"principal and agent," in his Preface. Id. at vii.
4 JOSEPH STORY, COMIMNTARIES ON THE LAv OF AGENCY- AS A BRANCH OF
COMERCIAL AND MARITIE JuRISPRUDENCE (1839). The Preface (p. v.) de-
scribes the work as "the commencement of a series of Commentaries, which...
it is my design, if my life and health are prolonged, to publish upon the different
branches of commercial and maritime jurisprudence." Other early works on
agency are cited in 1 FLOYD R. NIEcHEmx, CASES ON AGENCY 10 (2d ed. 1914).
51 CA.RLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF DARLY
LEGAL CwNDsTIoNS iN AMERICA 436 (1908); 2 id. at 86.
62 id. at 431. This course name had been introduced in 1876. HARVARD
LAw SCHOOL CENTENNIAL HISTORY 76 (1918). Previously Agency had been
listed as a subject (id. at 75; 2 WA.RRN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 128), but it
540
WHAT'S WRONG WITH AGENCY?
"Agency" in these contexts meant largely contract law, concerned
as much with the contractual rights between the principal and the agent
as between the principal and the public. ' It definitely excluded the law
of "Master and Servant." 8 And it was largely unanalytic, taking the
rules and conceptions of the law as it found them without inquiring in-
to their justification and utility.
Holmes's conception of agency was different. He was not interested
in the phases which simply applied contract and tort rules to agency sit-
uations. He was interested in the phases of agency which made it differ-
ent from other subjects of law-particularly in those phases which
seemed to flow from the peculiar fiction whereby the agent and the'
principal are "feigned to be one person."
Wherever this fiction led, he wanted to follow it. Hence, agency did
not stop with contract law; it embraced also the law known as "Mas-
ter and Servant," where the fiction played. still stranger tricks. Its
study should extend to the doctrine of "ratification," by which an act
which was not originally the principal's becomes his by later approval,
"relating back" to the earlier time. Students were also to probe the
procedural and criminal-law distinction between "possession" and "cus-
tody," which rested on the identification idea.9 Wherever the fiction
led, Holmes found the law at war with common sense.'0
The Holmesian view of agency did not sweep rapidly through Amer-
ican law schools. It made no visible impression on *the first published
"casebook on agency, presented in 1893 by Floyd R. Mechem of the
University of Michigan." Like Paley in 1811, Professor Mechem
was probably regarded as a subtitle of "Commercial and Maritime Law." See
1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 436.
7 See contents and text of PALEY, op. cit. supra note 3, and STORY, OP. cit.
supra note 4.
8 PALEY, op cit. supra note 3, at viii, expressly disclaimed anything more'than
incidental references to "Master and Servant."
9 Holmes, supra note 1, at 368-371. After referring to doctrines of so-called
agency law which are no more than applications of tort and contract law, he
concluded:
"If agency is a proper title of our corpus juris, its peculiarities must be sought
in doctrines that go farther than any yet mentioned. Such doctrines are to be
found in each of the great departments of the law. In tort, masters are held
answerable for conduct on the part of their servants, which they not only have
not authorized, but have forbidden. In contract, an undisclosed principal may
bind or be bound to another, who did not know of his very existence at the
time he made the contract. By a few words of ratification a man may make
a trespass or a contract his own in which he had no part in fact. The possession
of a tangible object may be attributed to him although he never saw it, and
may be denied to another who has it under his actual custody or control. The
existence of these rules is what makes agency a proper title in the law." Ia.
at 371.
10 Holmes, supra note 1, at 404-405.
1 FLOYD R. MECHE, CAsEs ON AGENCY (1893).
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expressly disclaimtd any intention to cover Master and Servant.'
Nor did he show any great interest in exploring the agency fictions. The
same may be said of the first edition of agency cases issued by Ernest
W. Huffcut of Cornell in 1896.13 Mechem's successor at Michigan,
Edwin C. Goddard, adhered to the mercantile conception of agency in
his casebook as late as 1914."4
But the Holmes view did have an impact at Harvard. Three years
after Holmes's lectures were delivered, "Agency and Carriers" became
simply "Agency." 15 At about the same time it was moved from the
third year to the second year in the curriculum -- possibly indicating
a recognition of its place among the "fundamentals." In 1896 Eugene
Wambaugh's Cases on Agency appeared, embodying many of Holmes's
ideas in a standard casebook.'1
Wambaugh's book began with the fiction which, in Holmes's mind,
united the diverse facets of agency law-qui facit per alium facit per se.
This was the heading of Chapter I, Section I, and the ratio decidendi
of the first case.' Medieval origins were illustrated by cases of 1304
and 1401; Latin texts appeared in the footnotes." The tort liabilities
of master and servant received equal emphasis with the contract liabil-
ities of principal and agent.20 The undisclosed agency cases were chosen
to highlight the fallacy of the identification theory; we find a jury re-
fusing three times to follow a judge's charge against a third person who
in good faith had paid the agent of an undisclosed principal.2 '
Gradually, the main features of the Holmes-Wambaugh pattern per-'
vaded the law school scene. By 1928-29, there was probably no prom-
lz Id. at iii.
13 ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, CASES ON AGExCY (1896).
14 EDIVIN C. GODDARD, CASES ON AGENCY (1914).
15 H~uv. CENT. HIST., supra note 6, at 76. Holmes had, of course, left Harvard
to pursue his duties as Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts after only one year of service at the law school.
16 2 WARREN, op. cit supra note 5, at 431, 445.
17 EUGENE WAMBAUGH, CASES ON AGENCY (1896). Wambaugh had been ap-
pointed to the Harvard faculty in 1892, but apparently did not take over the
Agency course until a little later. See 2 WARREN, op, cit. supra note 5, at
448-449.
18 WAmBAuGiH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1.
19 Id. at 1, 79.,
20 In Chapter TI-The Agent's Power to Subject his Principal to Liablities-
Torts occupies 158 pages (95-253), while Contracts occupies 105 pages (253-358).
"Topics Common to Torts and Contracts" occupies another 71 pages (358-429).
21 Scrimshire v. Alderton, 2 Strange 1182, 93 Eng.Rep. 1114 (1742-1743); WAM-
BAUGi, op. cit. supra note 17, at 627. Wambaugh omitted one of Holmess agen-
cy topics-the distinction between, "possession" and "custody," as drawn In
procedural and criminal law. He also added topics not mentioned by Holmes,
dealing with the relations of principals and agents to each other.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH AGENCY?
inent law school in which Agency was not a separate course, 2 and there
were very few in which it did not include the tort liability aspects of
"Master and Servant." 23 Mechem's first edition, confined to Principal
and Agent, had been re-edited by Professor Seavey to include the liabil-
ities of a "master." 24 Huffcut's first edition of 1896 had been suc-
ceeded by a second and third, in both of which Master and Servant
assumed a prominent position. 5 In 1924, Edwin R. Keedy of Pennsyl-
vania had brought out his agency cases, having similar scope.26
By the time the law of agency came to be graven in the tables of the
American Law Institute, there remained no dispute about its existence
as a separate topic, or its inclusion of "Master and Servant." Floyd R.
Mehem, the first Reporter, told the Institute, "I know that a good many
people . . . say there is no law of Agency," but he did not name
any of them, and none of the judges or lawyers present gave any in-
22 The course was listed as regularly offered in all of about twenty law school
announcements of this period examined by the writer.
23 This conclusion on the content of courses is based partly upon the content
of casebooks used. Obviously both may be misleading, since professors fail
notoriously to reach the parts of the casebook (or of the course description)
which do not interest them. But catalogues and casebooks are good evidence
of what professors intend to teach, and some evidence of what they do.
The casebooks examined in the preparation of this article are listed in chron-
ological order below:
1893. FLOxD R. IECHEm (MICmGAT), CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
1896. EUGENE WAMBAUGH (HARvARD), A SELECTION OF CASES ON AGENCY
1896. ERNEST W. HUFFCUT (CORNELL), CASES ON AGENCY
1907. EiNEST W. HuFFCUT (CORNELL), CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed.)
1911. GEORGE L. REINHARD (II-NDIAA), CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
1914. EDWIN C. GoDDARD (fCHIGAN), CASES Ox PRI-CIPAL AND AGENT
SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS
1924. WARRN A. SEAvEY (HARvARD) (2d ed. of MECHEM, above)
1924. EDWIN R. KE Y (PENNSYLVANIA), CASFES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
1926. HORACE E. WHITESIDE (CORNELL) (3d ed. of HuFncuT, above)
1933. ROSCOE T. STEFFEN (YALE), CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
1933. I ROSWELL MAGILL AND ROBERT P. HAMILTON (COLUIMBIA) CASES ON
BusIE Ss ORGANIZATION
1937. LAmrN K. JAMES (MICHIGAN), CASES AND MATERIALS ON BusnEss
ASSOCIATIONS
1938. KARL STECHER (LoUISviLLE), CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP
1938. KARL STECHER (LouIsVILLE), CASES ON AGENCY
1940. ROBERT E. MATHEWS (OIO), CASES AND MATERITAS ON THE LAW
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
1942. PHILIP MECHEM (IOWA), SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (3d
ed. of MECHEM, above)
1945. WARREN A. SEAVEY, (H[ARVARD), CASES ON AGENCY
19M. EDWIN R. KEEDY AND A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, OASES ON AGENCY
4 MzECHEm, CASES ON AGENCY (2d ed. by Warren E. SEAVEY, 1925). Herein cited
as SEAVEY'S MECHEM.
25 ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1907); ERNEST
W. HUFFCUT, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (3d ed. by Whiteside, 1926).
26 EDWIN R. KEEDY, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1924).
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dication of holding this belief.2 7  The sections which. disclosed that
masters and servants would be included were passed without comment
as the conferees leaped to battle over the definition of "independent con-
tractor." 28 True, "principal" and "agent" were defined by the first
Reporter as distinct conpepts from "master" and "servant." 29 But the.
final draft reduced masters and servants to the status of mere species in
the genera of principals and agents.
30
The SUBMERGENCE OF AGENCY
The unanimity about Agency, like many other types of unanimity exist-
ing in 1928, was to be short-lived. A new attitude was revealed in 1933
when Magill and Hamilton of Columbia renamed the subject "Business
Organizations I" 3 1 -the first part of a course including agency, partner-
ship, and corporations. In actual content, their casebook was largely
traditional. 3  But Steffen's compilation, which appeared the same
year,33 fulfilled the promise of Magill's title. It attempted to cover
the basic aspects of every representative relationship. "Corporation
law" on the removal of directors and "contract law" on the interpretation
of hiring agreements were laid alongside "agency" cases on the termina-
tion of authority. "Lack of authority" cases were compared with "ultra
vires" cases. "Workmen's compensation," "partnership responsibility,"
and "parent and subsidiary corporations" were all ranged in Smbuscade
under a cover marked "Agency." The University of Chicago, which
adopted the casebook, appropriately rechristened its course "Risk and
the Business Enterprise." 3
27 4 PROCEEDINGS A.L.I. 134 ff. (1926).
28 Id. at 144.
29 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 3-4 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1020). The draft recog-
nized, however, that a person might be simultaneously both principal and master,
or both agent and servant. Id. § 5.
30 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 1-2 and comments (1933).
311 ROSWELL INAGILL AND ROBERT P. HAMILTON, OASES ON- BUSINESS Oit-
GANMZATION (1933). Volume II, which was published in the following year,
dealt with partnerships, unincorporated associations, and corporations.
32 The principal novelties consisted of footnote material incorporating para-
graphs from books and law review articles. There were a few note paragraphs
on employers' liability acts and workmen's compensation.
The arrangement of cases was traditional, commencing with Creation... of
the Agency, and passing through Construction of the Grant of Authority, Claims
of Third Persons, etc., to a penultimate chapter on Termination.
33 ROSCOE T. STEFFEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1933). Steffen was
then, as now, Professor of Law at Yale.
3 4 
hNLvERsITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, AwNOUNcECEMENT (1939). The, new
title remained for several years, but had reverted by 1948 to old-fashioned
"Agency." Several other schools which used the book indicated Its content
in their course descriptions, although not in the course title.
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The merger of Agency with allied fields took a further step in
1940, with Mathews' casebook on "Agency and Partnership." " As
the editor avowed, it proceeded on the hypothesis "not that Agency
and Partnership are different fields . . . but that they are
essentially the same field. . . ." " Cases on agency and on
partnership lay side by side without even a section heading to separate
them. Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation were also
included.
Two other casebooks, of lesser influence, had also merged Agency
with other topics. Laylin James of Michigan relegated it to a later
chapter in'a 1400-page book on "Business Associations" (chiefly cor-
porations)." Karl Stecher of Louisville published a casebook on "Agen-
cy and Partnership" and another on "Agency" alone, both of which
incorporated workmen's compensation and employers' liability.38
Even Mechem's cases-the oldest name in the field-included a
chapter on Workmen's Compensation in its third edition, edited by
Philip Mechem of Iowa."9  -
Only two of the books which appeared in this period confined them-
selves to the subjects which made Agency for Wambaugh. Tliese,
edited by Seavey of Harvard and Keedy of Pennsylvania, ° are the
works of men who had published earlier editions in the Twenties.4
The roster of extant casebooks under, twenty-one years old can be
summarized about as follows:
Group 1. Shoying no substantial subject expansion since Wam-
baugh-two (Seavey, Keedy)
Group 2. Showing slight subject expansion since Wambaugh
-two (Philip Mechem, Stecher's Agency.)
Group 3. Combining agency with partnership, although not
mingling materials-two (Magill, Stecher's Agency
and Partnership)
35 IlOBERT E. MATHEWS, OASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP (1940). Mr. Mathews is Professor of Law at Ohio State Uni-
versity.
36 Id. at iii.
3a LAYLiN K. JAMES, CASES AND) MATERIALS ON BusINEss ASsoCIATIoNs (1937).
38 KARL STECHER, CASES ON TiE LAW OF AGENCY Ai-D PARTNERSHIP (1938);
STECHER, CASES ON AGENCY (1938).
39FLoYD R. MECHEM, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (3d ed. by
Philip Mechem, 1942). Herein cited as PHILI MECHEv. Philip Mechem, son
of Floyd R. Mechem, has since been named Professor of Law at the University
of Pennsylvania.
40WA!RREN A. SEAVEY, CASES ON AGENCY (1945); EDWIN R1. KEEDY AND A.
AnTttuI SCHILLER, CASES ON AGENCY (1948).
41 See SEA-vEY'S ME-cHEm, supra note 24, and KEEDY, op. cit. supra note 26.
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Group 4. Mingling agency materials with business associations
and industrial accidents-two (Steffen, Mathews)
Group 5. Mingling agency materials with business associations
-- one (James)
Counting casebooks is not, of course, a reliable index of educational
trends. A more important question is, Who uses them? A count
based solely on numbers would indicate an overwhelming preference
for the more traditional books. Using the above classifications, the
best information the publishers could give me suggests the following
distribution of adoptions by AALS members:42
Group 1: 48 (Seavey 47, Keedy 1) "
Group 2: 51 (Philip Mechem 48, Stecher's Agency 3)
Group 3: 9 (Magill 3, Stecher's Agency and Partnership 6).
Group 4: 31 (Mathews 16, Steffen 15)
Group 5: 1 (James) "'
Another significant approach would be to count the four schools
which, through their graduate study programs, have achieved a pre-
eminence in teacher training. It is reasonable to suppose that the
choices of these will be highly significant of the trends which may be
expected. This yields these results:
Group 1: one (Harvard)
Groups 2 and 3: None
Group 4: two (Yale, Columbia)
Group 5: one (Michigan)
While the facts may be analyzed in various ways, none of them
conceals a significant trend away from agency as a separate "title of
the law." There is a tendency to make it again, as it was before
Holmes, a segment of another field. But the field, this time, is that
of business organization. There is very little tendency to revive the
separation of Master-Servant from Principal-Agent, or to treat Agency
in the Paley-Story manner, as a facet of contract'law.
42 For these estimates, I am indebted to the courtesy of 3. T. Faber of Cailaghan
& Co., Mr. George H. Chapman of Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Mr.
William E. Cox of Bobbs-Merrill Co., and Mr. Hobart M. Yates of West Pub-
lishing Co. These gentlemen gave me reported adoptions as shown on their
records, with the express reserve that their information could not be guaranteed.
There were considerable duplications among the lists, but not such as to alter
the general magnitude of the numbers reported.
43 Since Professor Keedy's present edition became available after the opening
of the current school year, adoptions elsewhere than at Pennsylvania could not
have taken place when the information was collected.
44 James's Cases on Business Associations is used at several schools, but not
apparently for its agency materials.
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If we turn from casebooks to learned writing, we find further symp-
toms of a decline in Agency. There has been no treatise attempted
since Mechem's second edition of 1914. While hornbooks proliferate
for other first-year subjects, there has not been even a 'short reference
book on agency law since Mechem's Outlines of 1923 and Powell's revi-
sion of Tiffany in 1924."5 The best available text material on vicarious
liability now appears in a torts book. 6 A like scarcity of recent law
review writing is detectable, although not readily demonstrable in sta-
tistical terms.
The evidence indicates strongly a dissatisfaction with Agency as
law schools have presented it in the past, and a marked lack of scholar-
ly interest in topics it covered. In pages to follow, I want to disclose
some of the problems which give rise to the dissatisfaction. Some of
these problems are evidenced by the departures which later casebook
editors have attempted to make from the older patterns. Others must
remain my own surmises, based on conversations with teachers and
with students, and in part, perhaps, on reactions which are personal
to myself.
THE DEPREDATIONS OF THE LAWMAKERS
The Agency of Wambaugh was a beautifully conceived subject.
The vagaries of the abridgments, in which the subject must be pieced
together from titles like "Attorneys," "Agents," "Apprentices," "Fac-
tors," and "Servants" were left behind.4 7 For the first time, the law
45 Mr. Ludwig Teller published a text on agency in 1948 which appears to be
in the nature of a course olutline, usually citing only one classic case for each
point discussed. It is in no sense a general reference book.
46 WILLiAm L. PnossER, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW Or TORTS 471-504 (1941).
47 Comyns' Digest, supposed to have originated in 1694, contains agency ma-
terial under "Attorneys" (divided into "Attorneys in Court" and "Attorneys for
Other Purposes"), and under "Servants" as a subtitle of "Justices of the Peace"
(justices having jurisdiction of certain actions between masters and servants).
Further material appears in the "Appendix to Chancery," apparently added to
the Digest in the early 1800's, under the title "Principal and Agent." JoN
Comyxs, DIGEST (5th ed. 1822).





(subtitles) Principals and Agents and Factors
Partners and Joint Traders
MATThEW BAcO, ABRIDGiENT (Am. ed. 1856, from 7th English ed. 1831).
Dane's, the first American abridgment, contains some agency material under
procedural headings, as follows:
c. 30 Assumpsit-Factors
c. 47 Assumpsit-Master and Servant
c. 59 Case on Torts Against One for the Acts of his Agents, Apprentices
and Servants
NATHAN DANE, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF A.rERIcAx LAW (1823-1829).
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presented a title knitting together the whole subject of the employ-
ment of one man by another, whether for one job or for life, and
whether on commission or on payroll. Wambaugh covered all aspects
of this subject-not only the liabilities of principals to the public, but
their liabilities to their agents, and their agents' liabilities to them. It
was a basic, comprehensive title of the law, like "Contracts," "Torts,"
or "Crimes."
While Wambaugh's new design was becoming the universal fashion
in the law schools, something was happening to the threads of which
it was made. Legal rule after legal rule was cut down or totally
abolished by legislative action. The employer's near immunity to per-
sonal injury suits by the employee had disappeared in every important
industrial or commercial state.4" In a few years the right to receive
wages by contract would become insignificant in comparison with rights
based on minimum wage laws.49 Employers would be forbidden to
discriminate against womeno or against races and creeds."' While
casebooks continued to present the "creation of agency" as a matter of
contract, the most important prerequisite for a would-be real estate
agent became a state-issued license.52
Law professors responded in various ways to the intrusion of legis-
lative bacilli into the healthy body of Agency. At some points they
48 n 1928, forty-three states had workmen's compensation laws. The excep-
tions were Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
The history of the evolution from the fellow-servant rule to modem compensation
acts is well told by WALTER F. DODD, ADUMNSTRATION OF WORitmEN'S Co -
PENSATIO,- (1936).
49 Dating from the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (52 STAT. 1060,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1946)). A representative sample of 1948 cases on employees'
rights to wages and other compensation showed 58 per cent arising under
state (2 per cent) or federal (56 per cent) wage and hour laws; 33 per cent
arising under state and federal social security laws, and one per cent under
other statutes, leaving only 8 per cent to be decided substantially on grounds
of contractual rights to compensation. Even among the 8 per cent, statutes were
frequently involved in an incidental way.
50 An example is the Illinois statute, ILL.REV.STAT. c. 48, §§ 2a-2b (1947).
I have discovered no general compilation or analysis of the various states' pro-
visions on this subject.
51 Good recent notes include: Legislation Outlawing Discrimination in Employ-
meat, 5 LAw. GumD REv. 101 (1945); The Trend in State Fair Employment
Practice Legislation, 23 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 107 (1947).
52 The Illinois act on this subject, passed in 1921, provides fine, imprisonment,
and loss of compensation for operating as a real estate broker without a li-
cense. ILL.REv.STAT. c. 48, §§ 1-17 (1947). It is probably typical.
That such laws are widespread if not universal in American states Is sug-
gested by the dispersion of cases collected in Annotation, Who Is Real-Estate
Agent, Salesman, or Broker WVithin Meaning of Statute, 107 A.L.R. 774 (1947),
-and earlier annotations there cited. *
The statute books of some states also include licensing provisions for secur-
ities brokers and other types of agents. See, for example, ILL.REV.STAT. C.
12112, §§ 118, 124 (1947). In New York, a prize-fighter's manager must be li-
censed. Rosenfeld v. Jeffra, 165 Misc. 662, 1 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1937).
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applied anesthesia. The ancient common-law cases were reprinted in
new editions as though nothing had happened. At other points they
used excision, dropping from their books the points on which the
common-law decisions had become obsolete. But the subject of em-
ployer-employee relations was so full of excisions that one of the lead-
ing practitioners resorted to amputation. He wholly eliminated from
his course the large fraction which had dealt with reciprocal obliga-
tions of worker and proprietor. At the other extreme were those who
adopted prosthesis, by adding chapters composed of decisions under
workmen's compensation laws.
In point of fact, all of the books used a little of each technique.
Philip Mechem, in one of the two leading casebooks, used anesthesia
on the problem of an employee's rights to recover wages, 53 and pros-
thesis on the employer's liability for industrial accidents.4 Warren
A. Seavey used the amputation treatment on employer-employee re-
lations,55 but made some use of plastic surgery in inserting relevant
sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act, and other laws into his materials on a principal's contractual
obligations.5" The most energetic prostheticists were Mathews, 7 Stef-
fen,58 and Stecher.59 Relatively minor adaptations to the new legis-
lation were effected by Magill-Hamilton 60 and Keedy-Schiller.6
The disadvantages of failing to acquaint a student with the types
of law which occasion nine-tenths of modem litigation in a field, are
too obvious to be labored. Presumably there are few teachers who
53 Pn r MIECimt, supra note 39, at 465-471 (cases dated 1890, 1827, and 1878).
511d. at 513-581. An excellent collection of materials on workmen's compensa-
tion.
55 SEAvEY's mIEcns.iM, supra note 24, contains chapters on Duties of Agent to
Principal and Duties of Principal to Agent (at 730-834), which are wholly absent
from SEAVEY, op. cit. supra note 40. The latter is the only extant agency book
which wholly ignores inter-party relations of employer and employee. Seavey does
print one case arising under an unemployment tax (p. 16), and one arising under
workmen's compensation (p. 104), but neither is accompanied by any explanation
of the statutes. To the student, they will be simply additional applications of the
"master-servant" and "scope of employment" concepts.
56 SEAvEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 336, 446, 463, 561.
57 See MAxrnws, op. cit. supra note 35, at 818-826 (Federal Employers' Liability
Act), 827-869 (workmen's compensation).
58 See STEFFEN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 29-39 (tenure of corporate officers and
directors), 178-208 (workmen's compensation), 435-453 (corporate directors' ac-
tions), 454-472 (ultra vires corporate transactions).
59 See STECHEn, op. cit. supra note 38, at 150-209 (employers' liability laws and
workmen's compensation).
60 See MAGILL A.D HAl= TroN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 185 (one-page summary
of workmen's compensation law), 228 (one-page annotation on guest statutes), 259
(four-page annotation on permissive-use statutes).
61 See KEEDY AND Scnna=nn, op. cit. supra note 40, at 171-172 (permissive use
statutes). I find no reference to workmen's compensation or employers' liability in
this book.
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would condone the first three treatments, if teachable materials could
be assembled by the fourth. But none of the able and ingenious scholars
who have built social legislation into their Agency courses has been
able to escape serious difficulties in presentation. The cases make little
sense without the statutes, but most editors have felt obliged to omit
statutory texts, presumably because they differ from state to state.62
The cases do not seem to fit "logically" with the tort liability cases; 03
but they fit even less in a chapter on the principal's liability to the
agent, where they rub shoulders with suits for brokers' commissioners.
If put into a sort of appendix, they lose any cohesion with other
parts of the course.6"
Much smoother is the path of the editor who ignores the intrusion
of legislation. He can present cases which lead easily from one to
the next, all forming parts of a relatively seamless web."5 The student
who uses them may expect to gain a fine conception of the common-
law doctrine; but he will be pathetically unprepared for most of the
clients who are likely to visit his office.
RECIPROCAL ATTRACTIONS:
AGENCY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, TORTS
While labor legislation was boring at Agency from within, Partner-
ship was tugging at it (or being tugged by it) from without. The
central theme which had drawn together the components of Wam-
baugh's Agency was "vicarious liability"-the principle that one man
may be bound by the acts of another. But no one could follow the
02 Steffen and Stecher print the Federal Employer's Liability Act, but no com-
pensation acts. 'Mechem and Mathews print neither.
63 The chief difficulty is that teachers like to classify the subjects under "Liabili-
ties of Principals to Third Parties" and "Liabilities of Principals to Agents."
The tort liability cases fall into the first group, and automatically exclude liability
to the employee, who is by definition not a "third party." Further, the ordinary
tort cases rely mainly on common-law doctrines, while the compensation cases are-
statutory.
In this Writer's judgment, the obstacle is created by overworking the principal-
agent concept. In the digests, accident liabilities, whether to "third parties" or to
employees, are both covered under "Mlaster and Servant." It is clear that the
same fact situations lead to the questions which are debated both under respondeat
superior and under workmen's compensation.
64 See PHILIP AMEcum, op. cit. supra note 39, at 513-582. Professor Mechem has
tucked in workmen's compensation as a final chapter, following one which is
chiefly concerned with broker's commissions.
65 Seavey's casebook and Philip Mechem's, up to the last chapter, have a striking
continuity from case to case and from chapter to chapter. I have used Mechem
repeatedly, and have been greatly impressed with its teachability, owing in large
part to the gradual and coherent unfolding of the topic. Seavey's book, which I
have not used, appears to me to have a similar or even greater smoothness of flow.
As these are by far the most popular casebooks in the field, it seems likely that
their success is due in substantial part to their easy classroom use.
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principle far without noticing that it was as applicable to Partnership
as to Master and Servant. Baty, who denounced vicarious liability
in any context, could not exclude Partnership from his analysis.6 6
Douglas, who saw in it a device for justly "administering rislk," found
it operative in Partnership as in Agency.
67
These discoveries coincided with pressure on the Parnership course,
caused by the expansionism of the law of corporations. In some
schools, Partnership became a protectorate of Corporations in an alli-
ance called Business Associations. The other possible solution was
a course combining it with Agency. Steffen was the first to experi-
ment with the latter alternative,68 but it remained for Mathews fully
to exploit its possibilities.
Mathews' casebook illustrates brilliantly the identity of many issues
in the two subjects. For example, he places side by side a case where
a general manager signed a check on the principal's account, and one
where a partner signed a note on account of the partnership. 9  In
either case the question is the same-the scope of the business. The
Uniform Partnership Act makes the question identical in name as
well as substance when it declares one partner to be the "agent" of
the firm within the scope of the firm business."
The forward step that Steffen and Mathews had taken was signifi-
cant for many reasons. On the side of legal theory, it served to draw
together different applications of the idea of one man's "representing"
another. As a curricular device, it permitted the consolidation of two
courses with a saving of student time. To teachers enthusiastic over
law as a study of social institutions, or of, social functions, it offered
a stimulating opportunity of comparing different ways in which men
can associate their efforts in a business -enterprise.
Yet the new approach has caught on rather slowly, as my earlier sur-
vey of casebooks shows. The reasons are not far to seek. Once the
innovators had opened the door on a universe of business organization,
freed of the traditional boundaries of legal titles, they did not know
where to stop. Steffen plunged on into every problem of corporation law
that has any relation to agency law-de facto existence, shareholders'
liability, parent-subsidiary relations." Mathews was led on into the
66 THoMAs BATY, VIcAnious LTABIITY 44-49 (1916).
67 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YATE L.J. 720
(1928).
68 STEF EN, op. cif. supra note 33, at 615-670.
69 MIATnSWS, op. cit. supra note 35, at 175, 179.
7
0 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT (1914). Sec. 9: "EvEry partner is an agent of
the partnership for the purpose of its business . "
71 STEFrFx, op. cit. supra note 33, at 729-748 (De Facto Corporations), 748-766
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study of partnership property, as affected by the rights of creditors
and by dissolution. 2  In either case, the excursion led far from the
fact situations and the legal doctrines which gave Agency a common
core." Many teachers who have felt the attraction of Steffen's and
Mathews' enlarged views of Agency have probably shrunk from trying
to lead first-year students as far as these books go.
While one side of Agency feels the tug of Partnership, the other
senses the encroachment of Torts. At least one torts casebook has
attempted a coverage of Workmen's Compensation.74 Dean Pros-
ser's excellent text on torts covers vicarious liability as well as employ-
ers' liability at common law and under statutes." Perhaps the next
step will be a torts casebook taking over the whole master-servant
side of agency law.
This arrangement would offer some real advantages, in permitting
a comprehensive view of methods of redressing personal injuries.
Its hazards are equally obvious. Torts already breaks the seams of
a full-year course. Furthermore, the comprehensive view of personal
injury law would be attained at the expense of a comprehensive view
of the employment relationship. Curriculum planners will have to de-
cide which is the unit to be built up. The prolific tribe of Torts,
united only by a common ancestry in the action of trespass, has much less
contemporary appeal than the field of Agency, seen as a study of the
methods by which men associate themselves for business enterprise.
THE BATrLE OF CONCEPTS
A third battle of the Agency world is fought upon the field of
concepts. There will be no one to deny that concepts have been
peculiarly troublesome in agency law. The very subject of Agency
(Scope of Corporation Shareholder's Immunity), 766-790 (Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations). Other corporation problems covered by Steffen are referred to
above. See note 58 supra.
72 MATHEWS, op. cit. supra note 35, at 930-1026.
73 These problems are treated in most corporations casebooks. See, for example,
A.DOLF A. BERLE AND NVILLIAM. 0. WARREN, OASES AND MATERIALS ON TIE
LAW OF BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS 135-188, 315-331 (1948); ROBERT S. STEVENS
AND ARTHUR LARSON, CASES AND MATERIALs ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 11-
117, 151-186, 703-771 (1947).
Other editors who have broadened Agency to include Partnership have stopped
short of the' corporation problems. See M.ATHEWS, op. cit. supra note 35, and
STEOHER, op. cit. supra note 38.
74 L. P. WiLSox- CASES AND MATERIALS ON T .E LAW OF TORTS 909-938 (2d ed.
"1939).-
75 WH.LIA . L. PROSSER, HANDBOOKE OF THE LAW OF TORTS 471-504 (Vicarious
Liability), 505-548 (Employers' Liability) (1941).
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as we know it, following the Holmesian outline, is based on the con-
cept of one man's act becoming the act of another."
The role of concepts in most agency casebooks contrasts strikingly
with their role in, for example, casebooks in contracts. From Langdell
to Fuller, contracts casebooks have plunged immediately into the par-
ties' liabilities. In most of them the initial question is one of liability
for a particular type of act-an offer." There is no preliminary skir-
mishing with the abstract question of "What is a contract?" This may
be one of the several reasons why Contracts has always been among
the most satisfactory courses in the curriculum.
But agency books from Wambaugh to Seavey have usually begun
with the problem of "What is agency ?" "s Steffen and Philip Mechem
are the only two, in fifty years' history, to plunge immediately into a
liability question-when is a principal liable? "
As if it were not enough to lead the student through definitions of agen-
cy before he has met the practical applications of the subject, some books
begin with cases chosen apparently to show the difference between an
"agent" and a "servant." 80 This is a distinction with which the elder
Mechem struggled through two editions of his treatise and the tenta-
'6 See text and references in the first five paragraphs of this 'title.
77 See C. 0. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879), c. I,
Mutual Assent; ARTHUR L. CoR~nT, CASES ON THE LAW OF COEtRACTS (2d ed.
1933), c. 1, Offer and Acceptance; E. W. PATTERSON AND G. GOBLE, CASES ON TRE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 19-il), c. I, Offer and Acceptance.
Fuller is even more eager to get to essence of the matter, commencing with
cases on damages. LoN L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1947), C. 1, The General
Scope of the Legal Protection Accorded Contracts.
78 See WA [AUGB, op. cit. supra note 17, c. I, Introductory Topics, Sec. I, Qui
facit per alium . . . ; Sec. II, Who Can Be An Agent; SEAVEY'S MECHEM,
supra note 24, c. I, Nature of Agency, See. 1, Agency Distinguished from Other
Relationships; MATHmws, op. cit. supra note 35, See. 1, Nature and Indicia of the
[Representative] Relation.
In his latest edition, Seavey has almost emancipated himself from the definitional
approach, since his first chapter is substantially restricted to cases on vicarious
liability. But its heading is "Master and Servant," as distinguished from Chapter
2, Respondeat Superior. A teacher would probably need to take affirmative action
to make his students notice that the subject of "Master and Servant" is being
examined in the context of a claim of vicarious liability, and that the conclusions
reached have no necessary bearing in a master's action for enticement, for example.
However, Seavey's hook certainly does permit the teacher to present the question
in its liability context, if he wishes to.
'9 PHILIP MECHEm, op. cit. supra note 39, c. I, Vicarious Liability: The Course
of Employment; STEFFEN, Op. cit. Supra note 33, See. 1, Tenure: The Importance
of Contract.
80 This approach was apparently invented by the elder Mechem. FLOYD R.
MECHEm, CASES ON TuE LAW OF AGENCY (1893), c. I, Definitions and Divisions.
It was carried on by (among others) EDIV- C. GODDARD, CASES ON PRINCIPAL AND
AGENT (1914), and persists amazingly in KEEDY AND SCHILLER, Op. cit. supra
note 40.
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tive draft of the Restatement.8' The Institute finally laid it to rest,
after Professor Seavey became Reporter, by concluding that a servant
is an agent--of a particular variety. 2
When a student has surmounted the introductory chapter of the case-
book, his struggle with concepts has only begun. Probably the best ex-
ample of those that await him is the distinction between something
which is genuine authority, and those other things which are not genuine
authority, but are variously designated as "apparent authority," or "os-
tensible authority," or the result of an estoppel to deny authority, or
something for which no distinctive name exists.
83
The one thing clear about the bearers of all these different names is that
all of them result in the principal's being liable, which is the only question
at issue in the cases. According to one analyst, the principal does not
in all cases become liable on a "true contract"; but he admittedly becomes
liable in an action of assumpsit,s4 so that the distinction is difficult to
demonstrate to anyone not already convinced of its existence.
Under these circumstances, a casebook designed to encourage the
inductive method might be expected to lump together the cases that are
so confusingly similar, and let the student determine for himself wheth-
er they are alike or different. This was indeed the procedure chosen by
Wambaugh. 5  But the most popular contemporary casebooks segre-
gate their cases sharply into those supposed to illustrate authority that
is actual and those in which the authority is only apparent." One of
s In 1889 Professor Mechem observed that "the line of demarcation between the
relation of principal and agent, and that of master and servant, is exceedingly
difficult to define," and confessed that his best attempt at definition might be
found "not altogether satisfactory in actual application." FLOYD It. MECIEM, CASES
ox AGEN CY 2-4 (1889). In 1914 he accepted reluctantly the name of "Agency"
for the field of law comprising both relations, but still sought to maintain the
distinction between "agents" and "servants," although conceding that others might
find them indistinguishable. 1 FLOYD R. IN[ECHEm, OASES ON AGENCY 3-4, 19-20
(2d ed. 1914).
The tentative draft of the Restatement of Agency included sections distinguishing
agents from servants, but institute members had some difficulty In getting at the
Reporter's meaning in the "agency" section. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 3-4 (Tent.
Draft No. 1 1926) ; 4 PROCEEDINGS A.L.I. 141-144 (1926).
82 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 2, and comment a (1933). "A master Is a species of
principal, and a servant is a species of agent." The shift, which appeared In
Proposed Final Draft (3933) was one of a large number presented to the Institute
as dealing with language, not substance, and escaped membership debate. 11
PROCEEDINGS A.L.I. 77-78 (1933).
83 A classic discussion of these conceptions may be found In Seavey, The Ra.
tionale of Agenwy, 29 YAT L.J. 859, 872-885 (1920).
84 Id. at 877. Professor Seavey declines to call the resulting set of obligations
a contract because there is "no mutual assent, even by the use of the most violent
of presumptions." He does not, however, offer any other name for the set of
reciprocal obligations which result from the agent's dealings with the third person.
85 WAMBAUGH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 253-357.
86 See Pminxa MlECHEm, op. cit. supra note 39, c. IV, The Agent's Authority:
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these insures complete isolation by inserting two chapters on other topics
between the cases where the principal is bound by true authority and
those in which he is bound by something which looks like authority. 7
It would be a comparable practice in a Contracts course to close the
chapter on "true" consideration and follow it with two chapters on par-
ties and third parties before returning to the distasteful topic of promis-
sory estoppel.
Many teachers have doubtless experienced the difficulty of illuminating
the boundary between authority which is genuine and that which,
though spurious, has the same effects. The Restatement, which hews
to this line, is driven to a number of peculiar devices to maintain con-
sistency. In the chapter on interpretation, it devotes forty-eight sections
to interpretation of true authority, and one section to saying that the rules
for interpreting apparent authority are just the same.88 On the subject
of termination, it manages to state different rules for the different species
of authority,8" but explains in an aside that after the true authority
is ended, the apparent authority lingers on.9° Hence the agent continues
to have power to bind the principal, and the disappearance of true "au-
thority" becomes a matter of purely academic interest. It is no wonder
that a very able teacher of Agency recently confided, "Every year it
seems to take longer for my students to see the difference between actual
and apparent authority."
The struggle against such odds has been abandoned by two of the
contemporary casebooks in the field." Again, the abandonment of old
lines of demarcation raises new problems which are not easily solved.
In one of these books,92 as in the early work of Wambaugh,
9 3
the student is thrown upon a large and amorphous mass of cases with
no framework of organization to supplant the one that has been re-
Formalities; c. V, The Agent's Authority; Types of Sources; c. VI, The Agent's
Power to Bind the Principal in Excess of his Authority; c. VII, The Principal's
Responsibility for the Agent's Misrepresentations. SEAVEY, op. cit. supra note 45,
c. 4, Authority; c. 7, Unauthorized Transactions. STECHER, op. cit. supra note
38, c. IV, Acts of Agent in Field of Contract . . . (1) Scope of Authority in
General; (2) Apparent Authority; (3) Special Kinds of Authority.
87 SEAVEY, op. cit. supra note 87.
88 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933). Sections 32-48 and 50-81 state the rules for
"authority"; sec. 49 assimilates "apparent authority."
891d. §§ 105-124 (Termination of Authority), §§ 125-133 (Termination of Ap-
parent Authority).
90 Id. § 125, comment a.
91 STEFFEN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 350-400; AI rA ws, op. cit. supra note 35,
at 150-236. For a comment on the impracticability of maintaining distinctions
between "kinds" of authority, see Note, Analysis of "Apparent Authority" in
Principal and Agent, 1 U. OF CHI.L.REV. 337 (1933).
92 ILTHEws, op. cit. supra note 35, at 156-236.
93 WAMvBkUGH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 253-357.
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moved. A better solution seems to be that of Steffen, who breaks up
the cases into factual groups, dealing with land transactions, sales
cases, possession of goods, and the like. 4 Yet many teachers may feel
that Steffen has so submerged the lines of judicial doctrine that students
will have trouble in grasping the bases of argument to which judges cus-
tomarily resort.
A third problem in concepts which plagues the Agency courses con-
cerns dark closets of agency law such as nondisclosure of the principal
and ratification. The traditional treatment is to put each in a separate
chapter, which begins all over again with an introductory section on the
nature of undisclosed principals or the nature of ratification. 5 Students
are likely to emerge with little perception of 'the elements which are
common to the law of undisclosed principals and that of other principals,
or of the resemblances between the law of agents by authority (true or
spurious) and the law of agents by ratification. A satisfactory escape
from this maze remains to be discovered.
THE MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS
The law of agency is rich with major questions of social policy.
At the outset, there is the startling announcement by Professor (later
Justice) Holmes that the whole theory of vicarious liability is "op-
posed to common sense" 96-a charge which was repeated and documen-
ted, but not seriously challenged, for nearly thirty-five years. 7 Then
there was the spirited reply by Harold J. Laski, seconded by Professor
(later Dean) Smith and Professor (later Justice) Douglas.",
This conflict, which raged largely in academic circles, is even surpassed
in interest by the battle over the fellow-servant rule. There are few
9 4 STE= v, op. cit. supra note 33, at 350-400.
95 The best illustration of this "enclave" treatment Is In KEEDY AND SCHILnLER,
op. cit. supra note 40, at 341-406 (Ratification), 472-530 (Undisclosed Principal).
But something of the same appears in PHm=' IEcMv, Op. cit. supra note 39, at
280-336, and in SEAVEy, op. cit. supra note 45, at 574-666.
The latter two have, however, added a great deal of light to previous treatments.
Mechem's great merit is in separating the problem of the principal's liability from
that of his rights against the third party. Seavey offers a superb collection of
cases showing the relation of ratification to the third party's right to rescind.
96 Holmes, supra. note 1, at 404.
97 THo.As BATY, VicARious LIABiLiTy (1916). This is a brilliant and thorough
polemic, in which Mr. Baty purported to examine and demolish every vestige of
support for the rule which judges had then been following for two centuries, and
have since followed and expanded.
A rather amusing reiteration of Holmes's criticism, without the master's learning
or perspective, is Hackett, Why is a Master Liable for the Tort of Iis Servant?
7 HARv.L.REv. 107 (1893).
98 Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916) ; Smith, Frolic
and Detour, 23 CoL.L.REV. 444, 452-463 (1923); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and
Administration of Risk, 38 Y.. L.J. 584 (1929).
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episodes in legal history where the leading of judicial intuition was to
be more roundly denounced or more completely undone by elective
assemblies.9 If law's relation to social evolution is a fit subject for
study, there is no better case history than the fellow-servant rule.
On the contract side of agency, the policy conflicts have been less
extensively exploited, but they do exist. One of their subjects is the
rule that death, though unknown to any of the parties, terminates au-
thority-a rule which was denounced as "barbarous and archaic"
on the floor of the American Law Institute. There was no voice to
defend the merits of the rule; yet it was voted into blackletter under
the sign of stare decisis.'
The traditional approach, of course, knows nothing of conflicts of opin-
ion unless they are conflicts in the opinions of judges. The casebook of
the man who has most masterfully summarized the arguments for and
against vicarious liability,'' from Holmes to Douglas, gives a bare
citation to the original documents, and modestly omits all reference to
the summary.'02 When Professor Seavey took to the American Law
Institute his draft of a section on termination by death, he said:
Here is one thing you ought to argue about anyway. The bald statement
. . . indicates that when a principal dies, the agent's power to bind the
estate of the principal thereby terminates. This, it seems to many of us, is
a very shocking result. .03
But the reader of Seavey on Agency hears no echo of the storm.
The most persistent attempt to raise the classroom shades and see
the fistfights outside was made by Professor Steffen. His casebook
is divided into sections, each about right for a day's assignment. Each
section is devoted to one subject, often titled in terms of a policy prob-
lem, such as "Section 1: Tenure-The Importance of Contract";
"Section 21: Notice-The Organization Problem." For each section,
there is an editor's introductory note (in full-sized type) stating the prob-
lem and posing provocative questions about its solution. Steffen has,
however, respected decorum to the extent of leaving his questions tin-
99 This history is told in WALTER F. DODD, AD3I-NISTRATION OF WORK-MEN'S COM-
PENSATIO- 11-16 (1936). For an early polemic against the rule, see T. G. SHEAR-
i.A AI;DA. A. REDFIELD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE Vi-Vii (Introd., by
T. G. Shearman) (5th ed. 1898).
For an interesting analysis of the class bias that underlay the origin of the
fellow-servant rule, see Evatt, Judges andf Teachers of Public Lav, 53 HARv.L.REV,.
1145, 1150 (1940).
1.00 11 PROCEEDINGS A.L.I. 85-94 (1933).
101 See Professor Seavey's excellent monograph (cited by everyone but himself),
Speculations as to Respondeat superior, in H.RvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934).
102 SEAvEY, op. cit. supra note 45, at 1.
103 See note 101 supra.
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answered, unless one can find the answers in the cases he reprints. °
One teacher has observed that Steffen's focus on the implications of legal
rules has a great utility purely as a mnemonic device, since students
more readily remember a rule when sides have been taken for or against
it.
Two other editors indicate less optimism about the ability of students
to produce meaningful answers to such questions as Steffen poses; they
have taken the further step of printing textual material in which solutions
are discussed. Philip Mechem's reproduction of excerpts from The
Administration of Workmen's Compensation has been found useful
by many law teachers. 105 Mathews has included substantial excerpts
from Harold Laski on the policy questions of vicarious liability and
of workmen's compensation.' Both these developments seem desir-
able, but need to be expanded. And when a polemic writer like Laski
is quoted, balance would seem to require some statement, on a compara-
ble plane, of the opposing arguments.
Steffen and Mathews have also tried to highlight policy questions
by a radically new arrangement of the subject of agency, conforming to
lines of economic analysis rather than of judicial doctrine. The student
of Steffen's Agency confronts chapters with names like Management
Responsibility for Losses, The Risk of Business Failure, and The Per-
sonal Injury Risks. Mathews' Table of Contents reads like a treatise
on insurance, with scope of authority recaptioned Risk of Imposition of
Contract Liability, vicarious liability called Risk of Imposition of Tort
Liability, the agent's liability disguised as Nature and Extent of the
Risk Imposed, and some rather strained headings like Delegation as a
Factor in Risk and Ratification as a Risk. The law teacher is likely to
feel like Mr. Challis on reading Sanders' Uses and Trusts-"like a travel-
ler in a strange land, where everything wears an odd and unexpected
appearance." 10' This is probably a desirable experience for law teach-
ers. For a student there is the danger that after he has been brought up in
this strange land the home country of judicial reasoning will seem equally
strange when he returns to it.
104 Roscoe T. STEFFEN, CASES ox AGxCy (1933).
105 Pinmip MECiEm, op. cit. supra note 39, at 513-524.
106 MNATHEWS, op. cit. supra note 35, at 1, 815.
107 Hmuny W. OHALLIs, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 437 (3d ed. 1911). This should
never be quoted without adding Gray's comment: "This unfamiliar aspect of cer-
tain legal writers is a not uncommon experience. But it is largely a subjective
matter. Mr. Sanders strikes Mr. Challis as queer. I do not think he ever produced
that impression on me." JomN C. GnAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 581 (3d ed.
1915).
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It should be entirely possible to present the policy issues where they
arise, even under a conventional organization of the subject. In a modest
way, Philip Mechem has tried the latter approach. 08
There are other policy questions lying close to the heart of agency
law which the Agency courses miss, even though they are currently
the subject of vigorous debate in the Supreme Court bf the United
States and in the halls of Congress. The outstanding one is that over
the "economic reality" test of the independent contractor, as it has arisen
in the law of labor relations, of minimum wages, and of unemployment
insurance. 0 9 The cases are too recent for inclusion in most of the
casebooks, but seem likely to be excluded anyway by those which con-
fine agency to the study of common-law doctrines."0 An issue of simil-
ar import is the problem of the employee's time when coming to work
and leaving it. This question disclosed its potential repercussions in the
fight over portal-to-portal pay."' But it is doomed to exclusion from
Agency courses for the same reason that dooms the recent debates
on the independent contractor.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT?
This survey of Agency and of agency casebooks will probably lead
some readers to some conclusions, some to other conclusions, and some
to no conclusions. It has led me to some conclusions, which are set
out below.
Should Agency be partitioned? One solution of the Agency problem
is to split its time between Contracts and Torts. Let the Contracts
teacher take over the contractual liabilities of principals and their repre-
sentatives, while the Torts man takes on vicarious liability. If Agency
is to be confined to those remnants still dominated by judge-made law,
this is probably the best solution. For Agency without fts statutory side
lacks currency, either in terms of basic issues or of cases. The problems
lo In addition to his quotations from Dodd, supra note 105, Philip Mechem
quotes Holmes and Baty against vicarious liability, and Morris for it (at 1-2), but
in very condensed form, and in small-type footnotes.
1o9 See National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 64
Sup.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944); Hargis v. Wabash R. R., 163 F.2d 608 (C.C.A.
7th 1947); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 67 Sup.Ct. 1463, 91 L.Ed. 1757 (1947);
Amendment to Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 642, 80th'
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 14, 1948).
110 See discussion above under the heading, "The Depredations of the Lawmakers."
II1 See Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers,
325 U.S. '161, 65 Sup.Ct. 1063, 89 L.Ed. 1534 (1945); Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 61
STAT. 84, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (Supp.1948).
For evidence that the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act has not laid the question wholly
to rest, see Central Mo. Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 F.2d 641 (C.C.A.8th, 1948), dealing
with compensation for "sleeping time" put in by night telephone operators.
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of a principal's liability on common-law obligations can gain perspective
when seen in Contracts and Torts courses. The practical obstacle to this
solution is that Contracts and Torts are already exceeding the capacities
of men and of casebooks.
If Agency is not partitioned, it should not stop where the common
law stops. It should attempt to expose for study all the basic obliga-
tions of men who act through employees. It should include an introduc-
tion to those problems which result from laws on workmen's compen-
sation, minimum wages, social security, fair employment practices, and
broker licensing.
How can legislation be handled? Expansion in the statutory fields has
probably been inhibited by the thought that any one of these fields is
a world in itself, involving constitutional law, administrative law, dam-
ages, taxation, and conflict of laws. But this objection applies to un-
employment insurance statutes no more than it does to case law on the
negligence of chauffeurs. In each field, Agency can pick out that part
of the subject which deals with variations in the employment relation.
In both fields, it can leave matters of procedure, due process, and
jurisdiction to courses which can better deal with those topics. A num-
ber of successful casebooks demonstrate the feasibility of incorporating
workmen's compensation with agency; something similar can be done
with the other significant statutory topics.
The intelligent teaching of statutory law naturally requires supplying
the student with statutes. This is a corollary of the principles which
justify the case system. For the same reasons, the statutes must be
edited by stripping them down to the sections a student is expected to
read. Although statutes differ from state to state, so do judge-made
rules. There is probably no more variation in the workmen's com-
pensation laws of the forty-eight states than in judicial holdings on
vicarious liability. If this expanded area for the course seems in-
consistent with the name "Agency," the remedy is to change the name.
There is merit in Magill and Hamilton's title, "Business Organization
I." "2 At Illinois, where an expanded course is being used, the course
is called "Agency and Employment." 11
Jurisdictional disputes: Agency and related courses. There is no
need for Agency to encroach on other courses. It should not be allowed
to swallow Partnership in a school where most of the students are study-
ing that subject in a separate course. But in many schools, Partnership
132 I 1OSWELL MAGILL AND ROBERT P. HAMILTON, CASES ON BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATION (1933).
113 Mimeographed materials are being used.
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has fallen into the group of courses which are perpetually "Not of-
fered, 19XX-19XY." In others, it is taken by a handful of students
who need a two-hour course to fill out a senior -program. But the ele-
ments of partnership are part of the daily ration of practicing lawyers.
Some introduction to them belongs to all students, and Agency is an
-economical container for these elements.
The same arguments do not apply to those problems on the periphery
o-f corporation law involving de facto corporations and ultra vires
acts. For these there is an adequate separate course, and one which
contains a large part of the matrix to which de facto and ultra vires
belong. There is no apparent justification for inflating the agency course
with these subjects.
On its other flank, Agency should not be permitted to encroach on
.a job which is being done by courses in Labor Law or (where it is of-
fered) Workmen's Compensation. But both of these courses are usually
advanced electives, chosen by a minority of the student body; they aim
to explore the frontiers of their topics. All Agency can aim to do is sug-
gest in a general way the duties imposed by these kinds of laws, and to
outline their coverage so far as it is affected by conceptions of who
are "employers," and how broad is the "course of employment."
These courses would probably gain by having their students already in-
troduced to the existence of labor legislation and its purposes.
Will it be a hodge-podge? Few teachers are likely to challenge the
-value of injecting students with the complex of information outlined
in these paragraphs. Their question will be whether these diverse strains
,of virus are compatible, or whether their interactions will produce con-
vulsions. It would be futile to deny that Seavey's strain of common-
law principles is a more harmonious dose then Steffen's confection of
cases, statutes, policy questions, and observations on business practice.
To this writer it appears that the indigestibility of some of the more
.experimental courses is largely remediable, if one wants to remedy it.
If workmen's compensation is introduced by cases on jurisdiction in inter-
state employment cases, it will mix poorly with the other materials
of the course. If the same subject is presented by cases of employees
injured while driving on an unauthorized route, or at horseplay in the
shop, it will merge insensibly with the most traditional master-servant
-cases. The professor will be at pains to distinguish the issues involved,
rather than to tie them together.
Similarly, broker license laws will seem irrelevant to other principal-
agent cases if presented by cases on judicial review of the refusal of a
1949]
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license. But cases on the unlicensed broker's right to his commission
will harmoniously fill out the picture of an agent's right to compensation.
Legal essays can help the job of integration, not only for new materi-
als but for the old as well. Old English cases like Jones v. Hart 114
and Michael v. Alestree "I only begin to take on meaning for most stu-
dents when compared with the conflicting views of Holmes and Baty
about their origins." 6  Laski's retort to Holmes and Baty ties com-
mon-law vicarious liability to workmen's compensation, and suggests
the flow of ideas toward unemployment insurance and minimum wages.'1 7
Corbin's classic on the "authority" of an agent offers a vastly more
meaningful way of thinking about the actual and apparent authority
cases.
1 1 8
Agency can be modern, and still be teachable.
114 Pnuip IEC:Em, op. cit. supra note 39, at 1.
115 SEAVEY, op. cit. supra note 45, at 1.
116 See notes 1 and 97 supra.
117 See note 98 supra.
118 Comment, 34 YAE IJ. 788 (1925).
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